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CASE COMMENT
THE PROSECUTION’S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE IN SINGAPORE: 
MUHAMMAD BIN KADAR v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR  
[2011] 3 SLR 1205
CHEN SIYUAN*
A IntroductIon
The Court of Appeal (CA) judgment in Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor1 
created quite a stir in Singapore.2 The case pertained to a murder involving two 
suspects, and its resolution took almost six years, with many twists and turns as 
to the actual facts. The CA attributed the confusion in part to questionable 
practices adopted by the police and the prosecution at various points in the 
proceedings, and reserved strong words for them in its judgment.3 It also 
established new requirements for the prosecution regarding its duty to the court 
to disclose relevant material not favourable to the case it seeks to present.4 This 
piece focuses on these new requirements, and suggests that the premises invoked 
by the court to impose disclosure obligations on the prosecution are not completely 
consistent with what it concluded. It is also suggested that the court was at cross-
purposes with some of the arguments raised by the prosecution.
B decIsIon
Two brothers, Muhammad and Ismil, were charged with the brutal murder of a 
69-year-old woman in her own home. The alleged murder was committed while 
* LLB (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard), Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore 
Management University.
1 [2011] 3 SLR 1205 (Singapore Court of Appeal (SGCA)).
2 Kimberly Spykerman, ‘Police: investigations done with ‘utmost seriousness’ The Straits Times 
(Singapore, 9 July 2011) <http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/Singapore/Story/
STIStory_688835.html> accessed 16 December 2011; ‘Police officers reminded to comply with 
procedures’, Channel News Asia (Singapore, 8 July 2011) <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/
singaporelocalnews/view/1139783/1/.html> accessed 16 December 2011.
3 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [194]–[206]. Notably, this judgment came not long after the Court of 
Appeal had, in a rare move, roundly criticised an expert witness for the prosecution in Eu Lim Hoklai 
v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 167 (SGCA) [57]–[59].
4 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [76]–[121].
Published in Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal, 2011 December, 11, 2, 207-216.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/147293411799804498
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the deceased’s bedridden husband (Mr Loh) was in his bedroom. Initially, the 
prosecution, on the basis of Ismil’s statements to the police made a day after he was 
arrested, argued that he was the sole assailant. The prosecution did not think that 
Muhammad was involved in the actual murder, but argued that as he was also 
present at the scene of the crime, he shared a common intention with Ismil under 
s 34 of the Penal Code.5 However, Muhammad later claimed that he was the sole 
assailant. The prosecution then argued that Muhammad alone had inflicted the 
fatal wounds, but maintained the brothers were equally liable for murder pursuant 
to s 34. The brothers were convicted by the High Court to suffer capital punishment, 
though the identity of the actual assailant remained unascertained.6 
On appeal, the prosecution argued that only Muhammad should be found 
guilty for murder, while Ismil should be found guilty of committing robbery with 
hurt. The prosecution chose to rely on to Ismil’s early statements in which he had 
claimed to be the sole assailant, despite his subsequently invoking an alibi. The 
CA dismissed Muhammad’s appeal but set aside Ismil’s conviction, declaring he 
had not been proven guilty of any offence. This was in part due to ‘the complete 
absence’ of evidence to ‘establish that Ismil was present at the flat’.7 The court 
added that it was deeply troubled by the fact that the prosecution only provided 
certain vital pieces of evidence to the defence in phases and very late in the 
proceedings.8 
Specifically, the prosecution failed to disclose several statements made by 
Mr Loh wherein he had ‘clearly’, ‘consistently’, and ‘unambiguously’ stated that 
he only saw one intruder in the flat and even gave a ‘detailed description’ of the 
intruder.9 The prosecution maintained that any obligation to disclose was purely 
ethical in nature.10 The prosecution further gave three reasons as to why the 
statements were initially withheld: (a) they believed Mr Loh’s statements were 
neither credible (given the difficulties he had in expressing himself ) nor relevant; 
(b) during an identification parade, he was unable to identify the intruder even 
though Muhammad and Ismil were in the line-up; and (c) at no point was he 
deemed ‘sufficiently fit’ to clarify his evidence.11 
Despite these arguments, the court strongly criticised the prosecution’s conduct 
of the case. The court was cognisant of the existing local statutory requirements 
 5 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) (Singapore). Section 34 reads: ‘When a criminal act is done by 
several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that 
act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone.’
 6 Public Prosecutor v Ismil bin Kadar [2009] SGHC 84 (Singapore High Court) [495], [525].
 7 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [191].
 8 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [5], [152]–[158]. One statement was made a few days after the murder 
and another four months after the murder. Both were disclosed 18 months after the trial had 
commenced. Another statement was made one day after the murder and disclosed on the last day 
of the trial.
 9 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [5].
10 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [99].
11 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [198]. Mr Loh died a few months after the trial began.
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pertaining to the prosecution’s duty of disclosure, but incorporated additional 
principles from various common law jurisdictions in setting out new requirements 
under this duty. Singapore prosecutors now have to disclose to the defence: 
(a) any unused material [not including material neutral or adverse to the accused] 
that is likely to be admissible and that might reasonably be regarded as [prima 
facie] credible and relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused; and 
(b) any unused material [not including material neutral or adverse to the accused] 
that is likely to be inadmissible, but would provide a real (not fanciful) chance 
of pursuing a line of inquiry that leads to material that is likely to be admissible 
and that might reasonably be regarded as credible and relevant to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused.12 
c AnAlysIs of the court’s reAsonIng
1 CPC and CPC 2010
The CA surveyed the law to see if there was a legal obligation for the prosecution 
to disclose evidence like Mr Loh’s statements, which the court categorised as 
‘unused material’, or ‘material in the possession of the prosecution which will not 
be relied on at trial’.13 By way of background, the primary legislation that governs 
criminal proceedings in Singapore is the Criminal Procedure Code. There are 
two versions: the older version (CPC),14 which for the most part applies to 
prosecutions commenced before January 2011, and the current version (CPC 
2010),15 which applies to prosecutions commenced during or after January 2011. 
The prosecution of Muhammad and Ismil commenced in 2005.
The CA first noted that neither the CPC nor CPC 2010 expressly compels the 
prosecution to disclose any kind of unused material, such as statements made by 
an accused that the prosecution have no intention of relying on at trial, or 
documents revealing the existence and identities of persons who have information 
about the case but who will not be called as prosecution witnesses.16 The court 
then referred to Selvarajan James v Public Prosecutor,17 where an accused had asked 
for an order compelling the prosecution to produce a statement by his accomplice 
that could have exculpated him. It was held there that there was no statutory 
obligation for the prosecution to disclose the statement as the prosecution was not 
12 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [113]. At [114] the court specified that the test of credibility and relevance 
in (a) is an objective test. 
13 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [76].
14 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (Singapore) (CPC).
15 Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (Act 15 of 2010) (Singapore) (CPC 2010).
16 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [80]. See also Chin Tet Yung, ‘Remaking the Evidence Code’ (2009) 21 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 52, 89.
17 [2000] 2 SLR(R) 946 (SGHC)). 
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going to rely on it; moreover, it was for Parliament and not the court to introduce 
such an obligation into the CPC.18 However, the CA pointed out that unlike s 6 
of CPC 2010,19 s 5 of the CPC20 imposes a mandatory application of English law 
where the CPC is silent.21 It thus concluded that Selvarajan does not preclude 
Singapore courts from following ‘authorities and principles relating to the 
common law of prosecutorial disclosure . . . in England and adopted in other 
mature common law jurisdictions’.22 The court then proceeded with a survey of 
various jurisdictions, beginning, as it had to by virtue of the language of s 5 of the 
CPC, with England. It is at this point that some seeds of confusion were sown that 
began to sprout later on.
2 Reference to English cases decided before the CPIA
Regarding England, the CA observed that before the introduction of the Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA), cases were intricate, complex, 
difficult, and potentially required the prosecution to ‘disclose masses of material 
of only speculative relevance’.23 Parenthetically, two points are worth noting here. 
Firstly, the CPIA ‘was designed to alleviate the burdens of disclosure perceived 
to lie upon the police and prosecution under the old law, which it was felt were 
being exploited by those accused of crime’.24 Second, English cases prior to the 
CPIA are generally no longer considered when determining the English position 
on the prosecutor’s duty of disclosure.25 Despite recognising that most of the 
principles gleaned from the English cases (including those decided pursuant to 
the CPIA) are largely incompatible with the CPC and CPC 2010 (and thus are 
inapplicable),26 the CA said that the general principle that can be distilled from 
the English cases—the importance of achieving ‘a just outcome by means of a fair 
trial’—is ‘highly instructive’.27 A principle framed in such a broad level of 
abstraction is of limited utility in and of itself, but the court went on to state that 
18 Selvarajan James (n 17) [18]–[19].
19 s 6 reads: ‘As regards matters of criminal procedure for which no special provision has been made 
by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, such procedure as the justice of the case 
may require, and which is not inconsistent with this Code or such other law, may be adopted’ (CPC 
2010 (n 15)).
20 s 5 reads: ‘As regards matters of criminal procedure for which no special provision has been made 
by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force in Singapore the law relating to criminal 
procedure for the time being in force in England shall be applied so far as the procedure does not 
conflict or is not inconsistent with this Code and can be made auxiliary thereto’ (CPC (n 14)). 
21 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [106].
22 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [82].
23 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [86].
24 Colin Tapper, Cross & Tapper on Evidence (OUP 2010) 281.
25 Adrian Keane, James Griffiths, and Paul McKeown, The Modern Law of Evidence (OUP 2010) 433–35.
26 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [86]. For instance, R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex p Lee [1999] 1 WLR 
1950 (England and Wales Court of Appeal (EWCA)) obligates the prosecution to consider making 
disclosure at the moment of arrest.
27 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [86], [107].
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the ‘English common law disclosure regime is consistent with the position 
prevailing in all the other common law jurisdictions that we have surveyed’.28 
Two problems follow from this statement. 
First, it is unclear if the ‘regime’ refers exclusively to English cases decided 
before the CPIA was in effect. If so, then it is hard to see the point of surveying 
the cases of other jurisdictions that are consistent with a regime that the court had 
already declared to be largely incompatible with the CPC and CPC 2010—the 
logical upshot must be that all of the non-English cases are also largely incompatible 
with the CPC and CPC 2010. If, on the other hand, the ‘regime’ includes cases 
decided pursuant to the CPIA, it is hard to see how that regime can readily 
accommodate cases sitting on opposite sides of the fence that effectively cancel 
each other out when read together, given that the CPIA was intended to be a new 
regime that remedies the flaws developed by the jurisprudence prior to the CPIA’s 
inception. Indeed, the CPIA was meant to ‘limit the extent to which the defence 
could burden the prosecutor with requests for further information without 
indicating what they hoped to find’.29 Flowing from this, it is curious that the CA’s 
distillation of the principles of the ‘regime’ was predicated on cases arising both 
before and after the inception of the CPIA.30 Of course, one may take the view 
that the court’s analysis weaved together two distinct issues, that is, whether, 
under s 5 of the CPC, English law for the time being in force ought to be imported 
into Singapore, and whether, under s 6 of CPC 2010, disclosure rules ought to be 
fashioned for Singapore ‘as the justice of the case may require’.31 On that view, 
broad principles of fairness may be relevant to the latter issue, but then the 
statutory provision in question in Muhammad bin Kadar was s 5, and not s 6, and 
the disclosure test proposed by the CA was a common law one, and not a statutory 
one.32 For these reasons, the CA’s resort to English cases and the principles 
developed therein is questionable, or at least, it has created some uncertainty by 
failing to explain how and what in those cases applied.  
3 Commonwealth cases: the relevance-good faith distinction, and the 
problem of admissibility
Assuming one can surmount the obstacles mentioned above, there are still other 
obstacles in that the authorities surveyed in the other (non-English) jurisdictions 
do not fully provide the legal basis for the CA to conclude the way it did. Instead, 
those authorities essentially relate either to exhortations to the prosecution to be 
fair and accountable to the public and not to be overzealous in securing 
28 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [87].
29 Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (OUP 2010) 61.
30 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [85].
31 CPC 2010 (n 15) s 6. 
32 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [113].
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convictions, or to the general legal obligation for the prosecution to disclose 
evidence that is material to any given issue of the case.33 The former is not very 
problematic as it does not state anything over and above what must surely be trite 
propositions known to, and applied by, any self-respecting and credible 
prosecution. It is the latter that has the potential to cause confusion. 
To elaborate, there are a couple of important differences that need to be 
appreciated at the outset. One, the difference between evidence that is deemed 
(be it by the prosecution or by the court) relevant/irrelevant or material/
immaterial, and evidence that is deemed (likewise, be it by the prosecution or by 
the court) reliable/unreliable.34 Two, the difference between evidence that is 
being deliberately withheld out of bad faith, and evidence that is being withheld 
out of a good faith judgment. Admittedly, the concept of good faith can be elusive 
and difficult to define; for present purposes, however, a workable operative 
definition is that of honesty, absence of bad faith, and absence of any ulterior 
purpose.35 The two differences are important because the prosecution in 
Muhammad bin Kadar categorically maintained that Mr Loh’s statements were not 
disclosed early in the proceedings because it genuinely believed (in good faith) 
that the statements were non-credible or unreliable (as opposed to being 
irrelevant).36 One would imagine that if the prosecution was telling the truth, 
then it seems, intuitively at least, hard to fault them for being unethical, even if a 
court is entitled to later adjudge that the statements are objectively relevant. The 
CA did not believe the prosecution,37 which it was entitled to, but the authorities 
it cited and relied upon did not properly addresses the interplay between reliability, 
relevance, and good faith. It is apposite then, at this juncture, to turn to the 
illustrations that demonstrate the aforementioned second problem. The following 
list outlines the cases from the different jurisdictions (some of which even have 
legislation similar to the CPC38) and accompanying principles (sans the 
exhortations) as identified by the CA:
(1) Australia: the prosecution ‘may not suppress evidence in its possession . . . 
material to the contested issues in the trial. It must ordinarily provide such 
evidence to the defence.’39 
33 The CA also discerned from the authorities surveyed that it is for the court, and not the prosecution, 
to determine if the non-disclosure of relevant material is justified or not. This is more appropriately 
dealt with at a later juncture in this piece.
34 It may be said that in Singapore, any evidence that is deemed admissible via the Evidence Act (Cap 
97 (1997 Rev Ed)) is likely (but not necessarily) deemed reliable: Jeffrey Pinsler SC, Evidence and the 
Litigation Process (LexisNexis 2010) 37–39.
35 This is generally the definition used in Singapore cases: Tsai Jean v Har Mee Lee [2009] 2 SLR(R) 1 
(SGHC). 
36 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [198]–[200].
37 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [198]–[200]. 
38 Namely, Malaysia and Brunei.
39 Mallard v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 125 (High Court of Australia) [81].
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(2) Hong Kong: ‘Non-disclosure to the defence of relevant material, even if not 
attributable to any breach by the prosecutor of his duty to disclose, can result 
in material irregularity and an unsafe conviction.’40
(3) Canada: the purpose of a prosecution ‘is to lay before a jury what the 
Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a 
crime’.41
(4) India: the duty of the prosecution is to place before the court ‘whatever 
evidence is in his possession, whether it be in favour or against the accused’.42
(5) Malaysia: if the prosecution ‘knows of a credible witness who can speak to 
material facts which tend to show the prisoner to be innocent, he must either 
call that witness himself or make his statement available to the defence’.43
(6) Brunei: unless the prosecution has ‘good reasons for withholding a statement’, 
it cannot refuse to disclose it and make it available.44
As can be seen, there is nothing that properly addresses the said interplay between 
reliability, relevance, and good faith. The most recurring element is that of 
materiality, or relevance, though one can perhaps make the argument that 
reliability is somehow subsumed under relevance.45 Further to that, one can 
argue that good faith can also be covered (albeit not completely) by the approach 
taken in Brunei, which uses the test of ‘good reasons for withholding a statement’, 
but as will be seen, the CA did not take the view that it is for the prosecution to 
decide if a piece of evidence is material and relevant. In any event, the CA 
directed both sets of counsel to make further submissions as to whether the 
prosecution was under any duty to the court to disclose to it material that was ‘a) 
not part of the prosecution’s case, b) from a seemingly credible source, c) that 
would be admissible in evidence and d) that may have a direct bearing on the 
guilt or innocence of an accused’.46 This is interesting because as stated above, it 
is clear that the authorities cited by the court pertain emphatically to relevance 
and materiality (and thus do not quite address one of the cornerstones of the 
prosecution’s argument), but in the directions it gave, the court also introduced 
the element of admissibility. 
Admissibility has always been a tricky concept and particularly in Singapore, 
there has been a perennial and unresolved debate surrounding the exact 
relationship between logical relevance, legal relevance, admissibility, weight, 
40 HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee & Securities and Futures Commission (Intervener) (2003) 6 HKCFAR 336 (Hong 
Kong Court of Final Appeal) [142].
41 Boucher v The Queen [1955] SCR 16 (Supreme Court of Canada) 23.
42 Sheshrao v The State 2001 Cri LJ 3805 (Karnataka High Court) [26].
43 Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Public Prosecutor [2007] 5 MLJ 666 (Court of Appeal (Putrajaya)) 
[9], citing Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348 (EWCA).
44 Yeo Tse Soon v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 MLJ 255 (Brunei Court of Criminal Appeal) 270F.
45 cf Robert Margolis, ‘The Concept of Relevance: In the Evidence Act and the Modern View’ (1990) 
11 Singapore Law Review 24.
46 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [99].
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probative value, prejudice, and the like.47 As an illustration, the Chief Justice 
(back when he was Attorney-General) once said that there is ‘no need for a judge 
[in Singapore] to go through the formal process of declaring [a piece of ] evidence 
inadmissible’, because ‘the judge can simply give whatever weight is appropriate 
to the evidence’.48 This statement was largely motivated by the fact that Singapore 
had long abolished the jury system and now relies entirely on trial judges to make 
findings of fact. The CA in Muhammad bin Kadar did briefly adopt a position with 
regard to admissibility, but it is submitted that there is much more to be clarified—
for instance, the court says admissibility in the Singapore context refers to a 
‘minimum standard of credibility and materiality’, but does not really explain 
why this should be the case.49 Indeed, academics have maintained for decades 
that Singapore’s Evidence Law was never drafted with a proper understanding of 
inter alia relevance and admissibility.50 While it may be said that this was not the 
best occasion for the court to address that definitional and conceptual conundrum, 
insofar as admissibility clearly features as one of the elements in its proposed test 
for disclosure, that conundrum indeed had to be addressed. Without more, the 
CA’s criticisms of the prosecution may be read as excessive. 
4 Speaking past the prosecution?
Putting all of that aside, one of the submissions that the prosecution made in 
response to the direction for further submissions was that the aforementioned 
duty to the court was only ethical in nature.51 It added that while this obligation 
was a continuing one, it (as the CA read it) retained the subjective prosecutorial 
discretion not to disclose, provided it acted bona fide and in consideration of the 
effect of other evidence available to it.52 In other words, the prosecution was 
echoing its consistent and recurring position, that of acting in good faith when 
presenting only the most reliable and relevant evidence before the court. The 
CA’s response was that first, if the duty was only ethical in nature, one would 
‘effectively sanction unscrupulous methods of prosecution with the court’s stamp 
of approval’.53 
However, this is not necessarily the case and the CA appear to have conflated 
the two distinct issues of whether the duty of disclosure is legal in additional to 
being ethical and what the standard of disclosure (whether legal or ethical) should 
47 See generally Margolis (n 45); Chen Siyuan, ‘Revisiting the Similar Fact Rule in Singapore’ 
(Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, forthcoming); Chen Siyuan, ‘Dealing with Unreliable Evidence’ 
(2011) Singapore Law Watch Commentaries 8/2011. 
48 Chan Sek Keong, ‘The Criminal Process—the Singapore Model’ (1996) 17 Singapore Law Review 
433, 456.
49 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [117].
50 Margolis (n 45) 24–27; Chen, ‘Revisiting the Similar Fact Rule’ (n 47).
51 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [100].
52 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [100]. 
53 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [110].
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be. It justified the legal nature of the duty by referring to ‘the general principles 
in the common law’, ‘parliamentary intention’, and ‘the wide scope of s 5 of the 
CPC’.54 The court referred principally to one of the Law Minister’s speeches 
concerning CPC 2010: ‘If [prosecutors] deliberately suppress material evidence, 
they will be acting in gross breach of their duties.’55 While the minister’s statement 
indeed suggests some sort of duty (though it is not clear whether it is of an ethical 
or legal nature), it also alludes to some sort of good faith. It ought to be recalled 
that the court’s eventual formulation of the duty sets the criteria as credibility and 
relevance, when there is authority to suggest that good/bad faith is just as 
important. 
The CA’s second response was that it is not for the prosecution to decide if a 
piece of evidence is credible and relevant, for only the courts have the power to 
enforce the duty.56 Although this may be true, it is not immediately apparent how 
this answered the prosecution’s argument. The prosecution argued that it should 
be adjudicated on the standard of subjective bona fides. The court was free to say 
the standard should be objective instead, but the prosecution did not go as far as 
to say that the court could not judge if the prosecution had acted bona fide. 
Moreover, one does wonder the practicality of ‘where there is any doubt about 
whether a piece of unused evidence is credible, the court should be allowed to 
make the final decision’.57 How does this actually translate into practice, given 
that complex prosecutions can involve many pieces and types of evidence? 
It is perhaps unsurprising that a few weeks after the judgment, the Attorney-
General’s Chambers sought clarification from the court regarding the exact 
scope of the duty to disclose,58 to which the court maintained in a supplementary 
judgment (this being an extremely rare practice) that:
First, there was no attempt by this court . . . to comprehensively state the law on this 
issue. Second, “the duty of disclosure certainly does not cover all unused material or 
even all evidence inconsistent with the Prosecution’s case”. Third, our judgment . . . 
does not frame any duty in relation to the work of investigators and how they ought to 
interact with the Prosecution. That issue did not arise on the facts before us. Fourth, we 
referred to the duty imposed on the Prosecution as applying continuously to undisclosed 
material “in its possession”, that is to say, within its knowledge.’59
54 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [110]. Of the three, only parliamentary intention remains unaddressed in 
this piece.
55 Singapore Parliamentary Debates Official Report 19 May 2010, vol 87, cols 563–64.
56 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [111]–[115].
57 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [115].
58 Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] SGCA 44 [1], [11]: ‘the prosecution requested. . . the 
temporary suspension. . . of the operation of [99]–[121] of Kadar . . . to allow the Attorney-General 
more time to study the full impact of Kadar for the purposes of advising the government whether to 
legislatively amend its effect . . . prosecution also submitted that the continued viability of a great 
deal of investigative and prosecutorial practice turned on a definitive resolution of the doubts they 
had raised. Specifically, if prosecutors had a duty to search through everything the investigators 
gathered in the course of their work. . .’
59 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 59) [13].
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Might this be an indication that the court had, in its original judgment, based its 
strong reaction on the patent injustice suffered by Ismil?
d conclusIon
Muhammad bin Kadar has the hallmarks of a seminal judgment: it is lengthy, 
contains many (and many kinds of ) authorities, and addresses novel points of law. 
It is submitted, however, that a detailed examination of the legal reasoning—
specifically the premise on which the duty to disclose unused material is 
grounded—reveals a series of questions as to whether the reasoning is logically 
defensible from the outset. The proposed test (based on relevance and credibility) 
appears to have conflated the two distinct issues of the nature of the duty to 
disclose and the standard of disclosure to be complied with (particularly the role 
of good faith of the prosecution). Indeed, while Ismil was probably rightly 
exonerated (on evidential grounds) of his conviction, one needs to be circumspect 
and fair in balancing the rights and responsibilities of both the prosecution and 
defence before criticising the prosecution for wrongly exercising its ‘perceived 
unfettered discretion on disclosure’ and for having failed in their ethical duty to 
the court.60
60 Indeed, the CA was rather cryptic in articulating the underlying reason for its admonishment of the 
Police and the prosecution: Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [194], [206].
